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Abstract 
This study contributes to insights into mechanisms that influence the successes 
and failures of emerging energy technologies. It is assumed that for an emerging 
technology to fruitfully develop, it should be fostered by a Technological 
Innovation System (TIS), which is the network of actors, institutions and 
technologies in which it is embedded. For an emerging technology a TIS has yet 
to be built up. The research focuses on the dynamics of this build-up process by 
mapping the development of seven key activities: so-called system functions. 
The main contribution revolves around the notion of cumulative causation, or the 
phenomenon that the build-up of a TIS may accelerate due to system functions 
reinforcing each other over time. As an empirical basis, an analysis is provided 
of the historical development of the TIS around automotive natural gas 
technology in the Netherlands (1970-2007). The results show that this TIS 
undergoes a gradual build-up in the 1970s, followed by a breakdown in the 1980s 
and, again, a build-up from 2000-2007. It is shown that, underlying these trends, 
there are different forms of cumulative causation, here called motors of 
innovation. The study provides strategic insights for practitioners that aspire to 
support such motors of innovation. 
 
 
Keywords: functions of technological innovation systems; cumulative causation; 
automotive natural gas.4 
 
1 Introduction 
Sustainable development requires radical structural change within the incumbent 
energy system. If such a sustainable energy transition is to take place, it is 
important that multiple sustainable energy technologies develop and eventually 
become embedded in the incumbent energy system (Bergek et al., 2008; Geels, 
2008; Sandén and Azar, 2005). Such technological innovation processes may be 
considered as trajectories that involve a build-up process wherein actors, 
institutions and technologies are increasingly aligned to each other. 
 
Recently, a number of studies have been conducted that aim for a better 
understanding of the dynamics of such a process of system build-up. The central 
idea in these studies is that technologies develop within the context of a network 
of actors, institutions, technologies and the interrelations between them (Carlsson 
et al., 2002). This Technological Innovation System (TIS) does not come into 
existence overnight but is gradually shaped over time. During a so-called 
formative stage, actors are drawn into the TIS, networks are formed and 
institutions are designed that make the technology fit better to its surrounding 
structures (Jacobsson and Bergek, 2004). The main contribution of this literature 
is that it provides insights in the dynamics that make up this build-up process. 
This is done by studying a set of seven key activities or ‘system functions’ 
(Hekkert et al., 2007). Examples are knowledge development, entrepreneurial 
activities, market formation. 
 
Central to this study is the notion of cumulative causation (Jacobsson and 
Bergek, 2004; Myrdal, 1957; Suurs, 2009; Suurs and Hekkert, 2009a). 5 
 
Cumulative causation is the phenomenon that the build-up of a TIS accelerates 
due to system functions interacting and reinforcing each other over time. For 
example, knowledge development is likely to benefit from entrepreneurial 
activities and entrepreneurial activities, in turn, will be induced by market 
formation. A number of empirical studies has now been conducted that focus on 
the identification of forms of cumulative causation, also called motors of 
innovation, in the development of sustainable energy technologies (Hillman et 
al., 2008; Negro et al., 2008; Suurs and Hekkert, 2009b, a). 
 
This literature consistently shows how a rapid TIS build-up benefits from 
cumulative causation. Indeed, it suggests that such self-reinforcing dynamics are 
necessary in order to establish a broad diffusion of sustainable energy 
technologies into the incumbent energy system. Moreover, derived from these 
insights, valuable lessons are provided, mainly in the form of strategic insights, 
for policy makers and other practitioners. This paper adds to this literature by 
providing a detailed analysis of the TIS dynamics underlying the historical 
development of Automotive Natural Gas (ANG) technology in the Netherlands. 
 
It may be questioned whether ANG is a sustainable energy technology at all, but 
this is not a question that we raise. The choice for studying ANG technology is 
based on the fact that it is a trajectory with a rich history of dynamics and hence 
provides great opportunities for learning. Moreover, ANG is currently becoming 
very relevant as part of the Dutch energy (transition) policy. This is because, as 
an alternative to petrol and diesel, the combustion of natural gas is expected to 
result in a lower vehicle emission of nitrogen oxides (NOx), particulate matter 6 
 
(PM) and CO2 (Hekkert et al., 2005; TNO, 2003). Furthermore, the use of natural 
gas could improve security of supply by alleviating the dependency on oil (SN, 
2008b).  Another  reason  for  considering  ANG  is  that  it  may  provide  a 
steppingstone to more sustainable options, like hydrogen or biogas, in the future. 
 
This study offers important insights. In the first place by adding to the currently 
still scarce knowledge on the nature of TIS dynamics. A main outcome from case 
studies  done  so  far  has  been  the  identification  of  a  number  of  motors  of 
innovation (Hillman et al., 2008; Negro et al., 2008; Suurs, 2009; Suurs  and 
Hekkert, 2009a). In this study we continue the search for motors, with as a goal 
to underline, and expand, current insights into the dynamics of TIS build-up. 
 
A  second  contribution  is  that  this  study  develops  the  idea  that  motors  of 
innovation are related to the structural configuration of a TIS. In the studies done 
so far, structural drivers and barriers - blocking and inducement factors - were 
identified but these were not systematically related to motors. Also, the impact of 
motors on TIS structures was not explicitly taken into account. This study aims 
for  a  better  understanding  of  the  drivers  and  barriers  that  cause  motors  of 
innovation to emerge, develop and (possibly) decline and of the influence of the 
motors, in turn, on these structural factors. 
 
A  third  contribution  to  the  literature  is  related  to  the  specific  nature  of 
Automotive Natural Gas (ANG) technology. The ANG technology is relatively 
mature  (NGV,  2008;  Verbeek,  2002)  and,  as  far  as  the  production  and 
distribution  of  the  fuel  is  concerned,  ANG  technology  involves  mostly 7 
 
incremental changes to the incumbent energy system.
1 This is because natural 
gas has been used for heat and power production in the Netherlands ever since 
the  1960s  (Verbong and  Geels, 2007).  However, despite the availability of a 
strong knowledge base, a production system and even an attractive price setting 
of  natural  gas  compared  with  petrol  or  diesel,  the  development  of  ANG 
technology  has  been  hampered  for  more  than  30  years.  Only  recently  have 
developments around ANG technology been taking off, as a modest market for 
Natural Gas Vehicles (NGVs) is emerging. It will be interesting to find out how 
the ANG Technology Innovation System (ANGTIS) has managed to develop and 
overcome its barriers to realise a take-off. 
 
The following research questions are central to this study: 
 
RQ 1: What were the motors of innovation that (positively and negatively) 
constituted the development of the ANGTIS in the Netherlands between 1970 and 
2007? 
RQ 2: What were the underlying structural drivers and barriers that explained 
the emergence of the motors of innovation in the ANGTIS? 
RQ 3: How did the motors of innovation in turn influence ANGTIS structures? 
 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an 
overview of theoretical concepts and of the applied methodology. Section 3 
provides a technological outline of ANG technology. The actual analysis is 
presented in Section 4. A conclusion and discussion are given in Section 5. 8 
 
2 The Technological Innovation Systems approach 
The TIS approach has been explained in earlier studies (Hekkert et al., 2007; 
Jacobsson  and  Johnson,  2000;  Jacobsson  and  Lauber,  2006;  Markard  and 
Truffer, 2008; Negro et al., 2007; Sagar and Holdren, 2002; Suurs, 2009; Suurs 
and Hekkert, 2009a; Van Alphen et al., 2008). Therefore, this section is limited 
to provide only a short explanation of the core concepts as they are applied to the 
analysis  of  the  ANG  case.  A  TIS  analysis  may  focus  on  structures  and/or 
processes. Both perspectives will be discussed separately. Specific attention will 
be given to some  additional ideas  that are developed  for the purpose of  this 




Structural factors represent the static aspect of a TIS; they involve elements that 
are relatively stable over time. Three basic categories are distinguished: actors, 
institutions and technologies. 
 
·  Actors  involve  organisations  contributing  to  the  emerging  technology  in 
focus, as a developer or adopter, or indirectly as a regulator, financer, etc. In 
this  study  a  distinction  is  made  between  so-called  enactors  and  selectors 
(Garud and Ahlstrom, 1997). Enactors are actors that are directly involved in 
the development of a particular technology and fundamentally dependent on 
its success, whereas selectors are actors that are engaged at a distance, for 
example because they have the possibility to choose between many options. 9 
 
 
·  Institutions are ‘the rules of the game’ (North, 1990) (p. 3), such as laws, 
regulations, norms. They also involve cognitive rules, i.e., search heuristics 
and shared promises or expectations (Suurs, 2009). 
 
·  Technological  factors  consist  of  artefacts  and  the  technological 
infrastructures in which they are integrated. They also involve the techno-
economic workings of such artefacts, including costs, safety, reliability and 
effects of up-scaling (Suurs, 2009). 
 
Structural factors are merely the building blocks of the TIS. In an actual TIS, 
they  are  linked  to  each  other.  If  they  form  configurations  they  are  called 
networks (Suurs, 2009). 
 
TIS processes and cumulative causation 
The focus of this study is on the dynamic aspect of a TIS, in other words the 
build-up of a TIS. The idea is to consider the TIS as a system with a purpose, 
which is to be served through the fulfilment of a set of system functions (Bergek, 
2002). These system functions are (types of) activities necessary for TIS build-
up.  An  overview  of  the  system  function,  based  on  Hekkert  et  al.  (2007),  is 
provided  in Table 1. 
 
Each  system  function  can  be  fulfilled  in  various  ways.  It  is  also  possible  to 
consider  activities  that  contribute  negatively  as  the  fulfilment  of  a  system 
function. These negative contributions imply a (partial) breakdown of the TIS. 10 
 
 
The notion of cumulative causation suggests that system functions may reinforce 
each other over  time, thereby resulting  in a virtuous  cycle.  For  example, the 
successful  realisation  of  a  research  project,  contributing  to  Knowledge 
Development, may result in high expectations, contributing to Guidance of the 
Search, among policy makers, which may, subsequently, trigger the start-up of a 
subsidy programme, contributing to Resource Mobilisation, which induces even 
more research activities; Knowledge Development, Guidance of the Search, etc.. 
System  functions  may  also  reinforce  each  other  ‘downwards’.  In  that  case  a 
sequence may result in conflicting developments or a vicious cycle. 
 
The relation between process and structure 
It is important to understand under what conditions motors of innovation are 
shaped. In this light it should be noted that motors are not independent of the TIS 
structures. On the contrary, motors emerge from a configuration of structural 
factors  and  in  turn  rearrange  that  configuration.  This  mutual  relation  will  be 
highlighted  in  the  empirical  analysis.  Obviously,  motors  are  coupled  to 
developments external to the respective TIS as well. 
 
Event history analysis 
This study should result in the identification of structures and system functions 
within the TIS. In order to realise this the event history analysis, as developed by 
Van de Ven and colleagues (2000; Van de Ven, 1990; Van de Ven, 1999), was 
applied. This method offers the possibility to operationalise and measure system 11 
 
functions by relating them to events. Examples of such events are studies carried 
out, conferences organised, plants constructed, policy measures issued, etc. In 
Table 1, an overview is  provided of types of events that correspond to each 
system function. 
 
The interaction between system functions was measured by tracking (causal) 
sequences of events, like in the example of a virtuous cycle given above. These 
patterns were interpreted as elements of a narrative. This narrative, made up of 
storylines related to the system functions and their interactions, was validated by 
means of interviews with ‘field experts’. The narrative provided the basis for 
further analysis. The method also allows for the identification of structures, 
internal and external to the TIS, that relate to the motors, either as underlying 
causes of change (drivers and barriers), or as targets of change (impact). 
 
The data for this study was gathered from digitalised media (covering especially 
the most recent time period 1995-2007), historical reports written by 
stakeholders (covering the period 1970-2000) and expert interviews which 
covered the whole history but especially the more recent developments. For this 
study, ten interviews were conducted with various experts in the field. The 
interviews were used to identify important events and also to check the validity 
of the narrative as a whole. 
 
### Insert Table 1 around here. 
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3. Technology overview 
As an automotive fuel, natural gas offers some advantages to petrol and diesel.
2 
It is expected to outperform petrol and diesel in terms of emissions, especially 
with respect to NOx and PM (TNO, 2003; Verbeek, 2002). Natural gas is also 
considered to be a welcome alternative to oil in the face of energy supply issues 
(Verbeek, 2002). But what is most unique, compared to other alternative 
automotive fuels, is that ANG technology is readily available and the cost 
structure of ANG technology is rather attractive, especially with respect to the 




The drawback lies in the investment costs. In order to make ANG technology a 
success a number of technological innovations are necessary (Verbeek, 2002). As 
explained above, the production and distribution infrastructure for natural gas is 
well developed. However, to be used in vehicles, the natural gas needs to be 
compressed.
4 Technically this amounts to the installation of a system of 
compressors, storage buffers and the adjustment of pump systems at (existing) 
refuelling stations.
5 For vehicles the required adjustments are small. All that is 
needed is a new (high-pressure) storage tank and the tuning of a regular petrol 
motor to the characteristics of the new fuel. 
 
The ANG technology may build upon a readily available production and 
distribution infrastructure. The downside is that the production of natural gas is 
in the hands of the same oil industries that produce petrol and diesel (which make 
up 97% of the automotive fuels market). Since the growth of ANG may eat into 13 
 
this incumbent market, the incentives to develop this option on the part of 
incumbent fuel producers has been rather weak. 
 
Since ANG technology is itself not climate neutral, nor renewable, advocates of 
ANG technology tend to point out possible linkages to other emerging TISs, 
most notably around biogas and hydrogen. The idea is that ANG could 
eventually be replaced by biogas, a biomass-based renewable, and this could be 
done without the necessity of additional infrastructure investments. A similar 
reasoning holds for (bio)hydrogen which could be blended with ANG in 
increasing amounts. This way the deployment of ANG infrastructure may 






Figure 1: Natural gas price development, indexed at 2000, estimated for 
small users, including taxes. Source: EnergieNed (2006). 
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4 The event history of the ANGTIS 
This section is structured as a chronological narrative consisting of four episodes. 
For each episode, the shifts in the external environment of the ANGTIS are 
sketched in the first section. Then a narrative is presented in terms of events. At 
the end of the episode, a reflection is given on the narrative, focusing on the 
motors that occurred in that episode, the structural drivers and barriers that 
enabled it and the impact it had on the ANGTIS. 
 
4.1 Emergence (1970-1989) 
The first use of ANG technology dates back to the 1970s when the oil crisis posits 
a necessity to develop alternative fuels. Natural gas is abundantly available at 
this time, at low cost. During the 1980s oil prices drop again but then 
environmental issues become more pressing. 
  
The first experiments are initiated by utilities. Gas companies in Utrecht en 
Groningen start with the adoption of retrofitted NGVs (Verbeek, 2002). Driven 
by the promise of cheap, clean and abundantly available natural gas, the gas 
companies successfully build up a fleet of about 80 vehicles. They also construct 
their own refuelling stations. Other gas companies follow this example and in the 
late 1980s bus companies start adopting NGVs as well.
7 The companies are 
encouraged by actors involved in earlier experiments (Verbeek, 2002) and 




Despite the enthusiasm of the utilities, the outcome of the experiments is 
generally not positive. The main problems are the reliability of the refuelling 
infrastructure and the limited range of the NGVs. Also, the costs of investment 








The succession of events can be characterised as pivoting around 
Entrepreneurial Activities, Knowledge Development, Knowledge Diffusion and 
Guidance of the Search. The dynamics emerge when Guidance of the Search, 
arising from the enthusiasm of a handful of utilities, leads to Entrepreneurial 
Activities, in the form of adoption experiments, and Knowledge Development and 
Knowledge Diffusion, in the form of feasibility studies and the exchange of 
learning experiences. The sequence turns into a virtuous cycle as the experiments 
are copied by other utilities, thereby feeding back on Entrepreneurial Activities, 
Knowledge Development and Knowledge Diffusion. In so far as the results are 
positive, they boost Guidance of the Search as well. Due to the central role of the 
Entrepreneurial Activities in this motor it seems appropriate to denote this 






























The motor is constituted by government actors and utilities. Key drivers are (i) 
the external pressure of the oil crisis combined with (ii) the enthusiasm of a 
group of enactors in the form of dedicated companies aiming for an alternative to 
oil-based fuels. Through developing their Entrepreneurial Activities, the enactors 16 
 
manage to draw in selectors, in the form of government authorities and public 
transport companies. The enactors are able to do so because external conditions - 
high oil prices and readily available natural gas - put the selectors’ interests in 
line with their own. 
 
A downside is that the basis of this motor is limited to a small group of actors 
closely tied to the government. A key barrier that obstructs a broader 
development is the poor techno-economic performance of ANG technology, so 
























The Entrepreneurial Motor characterises the development of the ANGTIS for 
almost twenty years, in spite of the techno-economic drawbacks that ANG 
technology turns out to have. A main impact is the formation by enactors and 
selectors of a network in which knowledge on ANG technology is exchanged. 
Another important outcome is the installation of government support schemes for 
technology demonstrations. A third impact is the gradual diffusion of ANG 
applications among various energy utilities. A fourth, and less positive, impact is 
that experiments consistently point out that ANG technology suffers from 
numerous technological and economic bottlenecks. 
 
An overview of drivers, barriers and impacts is presented in Table 2. 
 
### Insert Table 2 here. 17 
 
 
4.2 Decline (1990-1999) 
In the 1990s the oil price is at a historical low but environmental issues remain 
pressing in national politics. The prime focus of energy policy, though, becomes 
the liberalisation of the energy sector. Only in the late 1990s do environmental 
issues, fuelled by the debate on climate change, gain a central position again. 
 
The general tendency in this period is projects being abandoned and enthusiasm 
for ANG technology declining (SN, 2008a). The number of NGVs in service, 
reached in the 1990s, is 500-600 (Verbeek, 2002). This number now declines as 
gas companies tend to shift focus to their core business.
8 Also, they abandon the 
exploitation of refuelling infrastructure.
9 The termination of projects leads to a 
negative image of ANG technology among potential adopters (Verbeek, 2002). 
 
The actors that committed themselves earlier to ANG technology nevertheless 
continue to contribute to the build-up of the ANGTIS. For example, Gas 
Company Noord-Holland and Energy Company Amsterdam adopt NGV vehicles 
to become part of their fleets. The companies construct refuelling stations as well 
(Verbeek, 2002).
10 Some other projects are started in the second half of the 
1990s. An important development is the participation of municipalities aiming 
for clean road transport in the inner cities (LK, 2001; Verbeek, 2002). The 




The techno-economic results of these projects are still not positive. The 
investments remain high and technical issues keep posing problems (FEM, 
2004). Nevertheless, two developments can be singled out as important 
precursors to a more fruitful development of the ANGTIS in the future. A first is 
the establishment of NGV-Holland, a platform which serves to promote ANG 
technology (Verbeek, 2002). The ANG advocates manage to persuade 
governments and intermediaries to establish licensing procedures and safety 




The second development is the emergence of small niche markets. This starts as 
early as 1990 when Canal Bus, a company operating boats on the Amsterdam 
canals, adopts natural gas for its boats. Due to the absence of noise and smell, 
natural gas boats are allowed in waters where diesel boats are forbidden 
(Verbeek, 2002). Similar benefits result in the formation of niche applications for 
(indoor) ice-swabbing vehicles, for forklifts and shovels that operate in glass 









The dominant dynamic in the 1990s is that of a declining ANGTIS, signifying a 
motor of decline. The abandonment of Entrepreneurial Activities results in 
negative Guidance of the Search, and since this affects potential ANG adopters it 
becomes increasingly difficult to gather support necessary for new 
Entrepreneurial Activities. The decline of Entrepreneurial Activities 19 
 
subsequently leads to a decline in Knowledge Development and Knowledge 
Diffusion. 
  
It can, however, be argued that the Entrepreneurial Motor is still active, although 
it has been stripped to its core in terms of structures. A handful of enactors 
manages to keep up a basic level of Entrepreneurial Activities, Guidance of the 
Search, Knowledge Development and Knowledge Diffusion basically according 
to the same interaction pattern as in the previous period. An important 
augmentation is that enactors become more active in promoting ANG technology 
among businesses and in lobbying governments for Resource Mobilisation and 
Guidance of the Search. The dynamic is strengthened through emerging niche 
markets for applications where low emissions come with a high advantage. Note 






























The motor of decline is largely driven by the (external) liberalisation trend. It 
could be argued that when gas companies are merged into larger energy utilities, 
these enactors are effectively turned into selectors. These newborn energy 
companies typically apply an evaluative logic that puts innovation second to 
reorganisation. Even when innovation is considered, the meagre outcomes of the 
projects undertaken so far do not encourage a choice for ANG technology. This 
negatively affects Guidance of the Search and Entrepreneurial Activities. The 
few market niches provide some stability in the turbulent liberalisation context as 
most niche-based projects are retained throughout the 1990s. 
 20 
 
The Entrepreneurial Motor observed in the previous period remains active due to 
the commitment of a small enactor group consisting mainly of gas companies. 
The enactors’ main strategy is to continue their projects and to join forces with 
municipalities, thereby targeting Guidance of the Search and Support from 
Advocacy Coalitions. They also draw in selectors in the form of national and 
European governments; this is basically what keeps the ANGTIS alive during 























In terms of impact it should be stressed again that the ANGTIS declines. Only a 
small number of enactors remains active during this period. Nevertheless, they 
contribute to the build-up of the ANGTIS, particularly by setting up a platform 
that strengthens network relations within the ANGTIS. Moreover, the enactors 
manage to establish licensing and safety standards for NGVs and refuelling 
infrastructure. 
 
An overview of drivers, barriers and impacts is presented in Table 3. 
 
### Insert Table 3 here. 
  
4.3 Re-emergence (2000-2004) 
The EU sharpens air quality norms, which are implemented in Dutch law by 
2001 (EU, 1999). This has a large impact, especially on the level of local 
governments, since norms are being exceeded in many areas and this leads, via 21 
 
court decisions, to a full stop on regional construction plans (MNP, 2005). As a 
result ANG becomes increasingly attractive as a short-term alternative 
automotive fuel. On top of this, the climate issue and high oil prices become 
increasingly pressing policy issues (SN, 2008b; Westdijk, 2003).
13 
 
Municipalities are specifically interested in NG, since using it not only reduces 
PM but also NOx emissions, a problem not addressed by diesel-particle filters 
(SN, 2008b). However, there is as yet barely a refuelling infrastructure and most 
ANG projects have come to a halt.
14 The developments that do go ahead are still 
driven by NGV-Holland. Within this network, ANG technology is supported by 
basically two groups of actors: a coalition around the municipality of Haarlem 
(and Gas Company Haarlemmermeer (RWE)) and around Gas Company Cogas 
(DT, 2003). These groups build upon experience gained earlier. Their activities 
revolve around a series of demonstration projects, the goal of which is to 
demonstrate the merits of ANG technology in practice (Verbeek, 2002). The 




The gas companies and municipalities, organised within NGV-Holland, lobby for 
support from the national government, with the result that most projects are 
government-financed (NGV, 2008; SN, 2008a).
17 The projects are a success in 
terms of build-up as they lead a variety of actors to re-enter the ANGTIS (MoH, 
2008; Van der Hoeven, 2005; Verbeek, 2002).
18 A key event is the formation of 
DutCH4, a developer of turnkey ANG systems. DutCH4 provides knowledge to 
successfully realise ANG projects. On top of this, DutCH4 invests in 22 
 




By the end of 2003, government support for ANG demonstration projects is 
stopped because ANG technology has developed ‘beyond the stage of 
demonstration’ (SN, 2008a; Verbeek, 2002). This occurs at a time when firms 
involved actually demand market stimulation measures in order to continue their 
work.  
 
Despite the absence of supportive national policies, some direction is provided to 
the field when the results of a vehicle emission test, issued by MinVROM,
20 
show that ANG is, on all dimensions, favourable to diesel, petrol and LPG  
(Dutch4, 2007; TNO, 2003). The decision to take up NGVs into the test at all is 
taken after a lobby by NGV-Holland (NGV, 2007). More generally, the wide use 
of ANG technology results in important improvements to the techno-economic 
feasibility of ANG applications. This is for a large part the result of international 
developments as well. The near-commercial status of ANG technology provides 
an additional boost to the willingness of actors to enter the ANGTIS (FEM, 
2004; Verbeek, 2002). 
 
Due to the building prohibition, high oil prices and the lobbying of the ANG 
community, an increasing number of municipalities adopt NGVs for their fleets 
and stimulate businesses and utility companies to do so as well.
21 These 
developments are supported by DutCH4 as it is taking over the business of 
Cogas.
22 The gas company’s original plan was to provide ANG infrastructure 23 
 
coverage in the Twente region, but this is now turned into a plan to set up 
nationwide coverage (DTC, 2004b). Funding for these projects is (additionally) 
provided through generic energy subsidy programmes (NGV, 2007).
23 As part of 
these projects, feasibility studies are conducted with the purpose of revealing the 
economic advantages of ANG technology to potential adopters across the 
country (DG, 2004a; FD, 2005a; LC, 2005).
24 The results are now generally 
positive (MoH, 2008; SN, 2008a). 
 
On the basis of these positive experiences, a growing ANG community 
successfully lobbies national policy makers for supportive tax policies (DTC, 
2005). Also, multiple provincial governments and incumbent industries are 
becoming involved. The provinces set up conditions for concessions, compelling 
public transport companies to use NGVs (AC, 2006; Connexxion, 2007).
25 
Instances of large incumbents getting involved are three major Dutch energy 
companies (Gasunie, Eneco, Essent). These incumbents have so far been 
sceptical about ANG technology but now they prepare a manifesto envisioning 
the dawn of ANG technology in the Netherlands (FEM, 2004; WNGB, 2007). 
 
### Insert Table 4 around here. 
 
By 2004, the ANGTIS accounts for about 120 NGVs - approximately 40 in the 
Haarlem-Schiphol region and 80 in the Twente region - which are supported by 
six refuelling stations; see Table 4. This is undeniably a positive trend, however, 
these figures pale compared to the 70,000 NGVs utilised in Germany at the same 









It is again the gas companies and local governments which provide momentum to 
the ANGTIS by contributing to Entrepreneurial Activities, Knowledge 
Development, Knowledge Diffusion and Guidance of the Search. A key 
difference however, compared with the previous period, is that Support from 
Advocacy Coalitions and Resource Mobilisation are becoming very strong. At 
first this is mainly reflected in lobby activities aimed at generating subsidies for 
single projects. But later on, these activities are increasingly directed at Market 
Formation and Guidance of the Search, in the sense that they embody a plea for 
top-down government policies. When successful, these efforts result in a boost to 
Guidance of the Search, leading to new Entrepreneurial Activities. 
 
The conscious orientation of the enactors on the ANGTIS as a whole is a reason 
to denote this dynamic as a System Building Motor. A key feature of this new 
motor is that entrepreneurs are organising themselves, forming networks, and 
drawing new enactors and selectors into the TIS, especially local governments, 
intermediaries and interest groups. With this strong Support from Advocacy 
Coalitions they attempt to enforce the creation of a mass market for the emerging 
technology. Note that the rise of this motor is largely the result of the 
Entrepreneurial Motor which has paved the way in terms of actors (more 
































As environmental issues become more urgent, a number of selectors - in this 
instance, numerous municipalities - become more receptive to positive results as 
communicated by the enactors. This strengthens especially Guidance of the 
Search. A related driver is the technological progress established. Encouraged by 
this, enactors provide a boost to the ANGTIS by organising themselves into 
networks that actively pursue marketing, promotion and lobbying strategies, 
thereby targeting a whole range of system functions, most notably Support from 
Advocacy Coalitions. 
 
Note that the marketing activities are as yet stimulated with a rather limited 
budget (i.e., not by fiscal regulations) insufficient for a large scale infrastructure 
deployment. A related barrier is the poorly developed demand for ANG 
technology. Commercial organisations and private drivers are as yet not 
interested in adopting ANG technology. This is due to the absence of a clear 
fiscal policy framework. As long as ANG pricing remains uncertain, commercial 
parties will remain hesitant to invest in infrastructure required for large-scale 
























The most important impact of the System Building Motor is its tendency to draw 
selectors - governments and firms - into the ANGTIS, in this case these involve 
(formerly uninvolved) municipalities, car dealers and, most recently MinVROM. 
The involvement of these actors results in a bandwagon effect. A related 26 
 
structural change established during this period is that ANG technology has 
become more mature, meaning that it is ready for widespread application.
26 The 
inclusion of selectors and the diffusion of ANG technology relates to a third 
impact; a renewed belief in the techno-economic feasibility of ANG technology 
among enactors and selectors not yet part of the ANGTIS. 
 
An overview of drivers, barriers and impacts is presented in Table 5. 
 
### Insert Table 5 here. 
 
4.4 Take-off? (2005-2007) 
Local air quality standards continue to be the main driver for ANG development. 
In conjunction with this, the political priority of climate change reaches an all-
time high. The climate issue becomes especially important by the end of 2007 
when biofuels, which have so far been embraced internationally as the most 
attractive short-term alternative car fuel, are increasingly contested. As a result 
ANG becomes the last refuge of the green (SN, 2008b).
27 
 
As the ANGTIS develops, incumbents become a larger part of the system but 
there is an increasing resistance among incumbents as well, primarily from oil 
companies (MoH, 2008; WNGB, 2007).
28 Also, MinVROM is unwilling to 
support ANG technology with market creation measures (MinVROM, 2004; Van 
der Knoop, 2005).
29 Its viewpoint is that ANG technology is not a long-term 
solution, either for reducing NOx or PM, or for reducing CO2.
30 However, the 
ministry’s vision receives much criticism, especially from a working group 27 
 
within the Energy Transition Platform on Sustainable Mobility (PSM), a public-
private partnership connected to a variety of ministries.
31 The working group, 
backed by 40 companies, including four major energy companies, municipalities 
and NGOs, succeeds in convincing MinVROM to provide specific policy support 
for ANG technology after all (AC, 2005; SN, 2008b; Van der Knoop, 2005).
32 




By the end of 2006 the government announces two fiscal measures.
34 Firstly, it 
sets a low excise rate specifically for ANG.
35 It does not announce, however, for 
how long this rate will hold (SN, 2008b). Secondly, it sets a purchase tax-rate 
(BPM) that benefits energy efficient cars (DutCH4, 2006b). This results in the 
adoption of more NGVs among municipalities.
36 NGVs are adopted as fleet 
vehicles and refuelling stations are installed or planned. Many of these 
municipalities prepare regulations to provide cheap parking permits and (in some 
cases) financial incentives for purchases of NGVs (DT, 2006; DutCH4, 2006b; 
DV, 2006; LC, 2006). The involvement of provincial governments grows 
stronger as well, supporting the deployment of ANG infrastructure (DutCH4, 
2006c; SN, 2006a).
37 They also design concessions that favour ANG in public 
transport (DG, 2006; DvhN, 2006; PZC, 2006).
38 
 
The ANGTIS becomes stronger on the supply-side where DutCH4, Gasunie and 
partnerships, like the Energy Valley cluster, support ANG technology by 
financially and politically stimulating infrastructure development, but also by 
issuing discounts on fuel and NGVs (SN, 2006b). A key event contributing to 28 
 
this development is the start-up of Aardgas Mobiel, a network that promotes 
ANG technology on behalf of car manufacturers (Dutch4, 2007). A related 
development is the formation of CNG-net, a joint venture of DutCH4 and 
Ballast-Nedam, a large (infrastructure) construction company. CNG-net plans to 




In general, it can be stated that incumbents of the mobility sector, including 
branch organisation BOVAG, car dealers and manufacturers, now expect ANG 
demand to rise explosively (Bovag, 2007). The result is the entry into the system 
of so-called system integrators, mostly incumbent companies that arrange import 
and assembly of NGVs and ANG refuelling stations (SN, 2008b).
40 
 
A drawback is that private drivers are still absent since a refuelling infrastructure 
is still absent in most places, even though this is something that is now worked 
on.
41 A related problem is the uncertainty on the trade-in value of second-hand 
NGVs (SN, 2008b). This is especially relevant for fleet owners that may be 
obliged, in the near future, to renew all their vehicles if even stricter conditions 
are to be met (PZC, 2006). Due to this uncertainty a number of public transport 
companies protest against the concession policies set up by provincial 









It becomes clear that Guidance of the Search and Market Formation - both in the 
form of national government policies - have a strong effect on Entrepreneurial 29 
 
Activities and, resulting from these, on Resource Mobilisation in the form of 
large investments, particularly in ANG infrastructure. The latter two system 
functions are now stronger than before. The promise of a mass market for ANG 
applications means that Entrepreneurial Activities now arise due to the 
anticipation of actors - enactors and selectors alike. In some cases these even 
result in new contributions to Market Formation in the form of (lower-level) 
policies such as concession policies, lease plans or green parking zones. With the 
promise of a market, the importance of Support from Advocacy Coalitions 
lessens as firms are willing to make investments, even without (additional) 
government support. This means that a new form of cumulative causation has 
emerged. Given the primacy of the promise of a market, it seems fit to label it as 






























The ANGTIS developments are still externally driven by air quality norms and 
increasingly also by the climate issue. The most important internal driver of this 
motor is a shared belief, among enactors and selectors, translating into a joint 
Guidance of the Search, in the future of ANG technology as a means to 
contribute to mitigate both problems. This belief is underpinned by the national 
government putting up a regulatory framework that reduces uncertainty, thereby 
contributing to Guidance of the Search and Market Formation. The key to the 
dynamic that arises is that enactors and selectors do not need to put as much 
energy into lobbying efforts anymore. Instead they contribute directly to 
Entrepreneurial Activities and Resource Mobilisation. Selectors - most notably 
provinces and municipalities formerly not involved - are increasingly active to 30 
 
improve the policy environment as well, thereby contributing to Guidance of the 
Search and Market Formation. Among these selectors are incumbent firms and 
system integrators willing to invest in the ANGTIS. 
 
An important barrier is (still) the lack of a long-term policy perspective as the 
duration of the excise-rate remains uncertain. Also, demand for ANG technology 
remains weak as it depends heavily on local government authorities as fleet 
owners; private users are barely present. Another barrier is that some of the 
support policies - especially the concession policies - cause resistance among 
selectors, thereby contributing negatively to Guidance of the Search and Support 
from Advocacy Coalitions. 
 























A take-off has occurred. A key impact is the entrance of selectors that constitute 
a demand for ANG technology. With the presence of infrastructure contractors 
and numerous fleet owners, a modest market diffusion process has started. This 
is underlined by the numbers in Table 6 which show that numerous refuelling 
stations are being built. 
 
An overview of drivers, barriers and impacts is presented in Table 7. 
 




5 Conclusion and discussion 
The aim of this chapter was to analyse the development of the Dutch ANGTIS 
and, thereby, to provide insights into the dynamics of TIS build-up. This section 
provides a summary of the results and a discussion of their implications for 
intervention strategies intended at supporting TIS dynamics within the context of 
sustainable, or emerging, energy technologies. 
 
5.1 The Entrepreneurial Motor 
Three motors of innovation were identified. The Entrepreneurial Motor, the first 
one observed, emerged in the 1970s and was active until well into the 1990s. It 
was characterised by interactions between Entrepreneurial Activities, Knowledge 
Development, Knowledge Diffusion and Guidance of the Search. It was 
connected to Support from Advocacy Coalitions and Resource Mobilisation as 
well. 
 
The event sequence was characterised by utility companies and firms entering 
the TIS and venturing into Entrepreneurial Activities. This especially led to 
Knowledge Development and Guidance of the Search, which in turn reinforced 
Entrepreneurial Activities. On most occasions Resource Mobilisation was the 
result of firms lobbying for government subsidies. This contributed strongly to 
the Support from Advocacy Coalitions function. 
 
The following structural drivers, barriers and impacts were identified: 32 
 
 
·  In terms of structural drivers, the basis of this motor was formed by a group 
of enactors, involving utilities and municipalities, that managed to persuade 
an increasing number of selectors (bus companies, boating companies, 
governments) into supporting demonstrations of ANG technology. 
 
·  A structural barrier of the Entrepreneurial Motor was its narrow actor basis, 
especially the lack of firms willing to adopt ANG technology. A related 
barrier was formed by persistent (unexpected) techno-economical problems 
of ANG technology. 
 
·  Important impacts of this motor were the formation of networks that 
strengthened the intermediary structure of the TIS, the application of safety 
standards, licensing procedures and the allocation of subsidies, thus 
supporting the institutional structure of the ANGTIS. Another impact was the 
(gradual) development of the emerging ANG technology into (more) reliable 
applications. 
 
5.2 The System Building Motor 
The system functions that formed the System Building Motor are Entrepreneurial 
Activities, Knowledge Development, Knowledge Diffusion, Guidance of the 
Search, Resource Mobilisation, Support from Advocacy Coalitions and Market 
Formation. All seven system functions were involved. Note that the Market 
Formation function was barely present in the Entrepreneurial Motor. Another 
difference lies in the connection between Support from Advocacy Coalitions on 33 
 
the one hand, and Market Formation and Guidance of the Search on the other. 
These connections were established through entrepreneurs that organised 
themselves in networks and managed to draw new enactors and selectors into the 
TIS, especially local governments, intermediaries and interest groups. They did 
this by lobbying the government, not for project-specific support measures, but 
for systemic policies aimed at Resource Mobilisation or Guidance of the Search 
beneficial to the emerging technological field as a whole. With this strong 
Support from Advocacy Coalitions, they attempted to enforce the creation of a 
mass market for the emerging technology. The outcome of these system-building 
attempts affected Guidance of the Search and Resource Mobilisation, with as a 
subsequent effect that even more Entrepreneurial Projects were developed by an 
increasing number of firms. 
 
·  This motor was driven by enactors and supportive selectors forming 
platforms and other networks. By strengthening the existing structures of the 
ANGTIS they managed to incorporate a multitude of selectors, for example, 
national government ministries and incumbent firms. Another driver was the 
increased reliability of ANG technology and its fit with the policy 
environment (standards, licences). 
 
·  A main structural barrier of the System Building Motor was the absence of a 
refuelling infrastructure and the lack of long-term (fiscal) policies to support 
its development. Another barrier was the rise of resistance among incumbent 
firms and governments. Since the growth of ANG technology would eat into 34 
 
the incumbent markets, incentives to support this technology on the part of 
incumbent fuel producers were weak or even negative. 
 
·  In terms of impact, this motor drove the ANGTIS from a local fragmented 
ANGTIS into a national integrated ANGTIS. A multitude of enactors and 
selectors were drawn in and networks were established across various 
components of the TIS. The most important outcome was the political 
breakthrough that resulted in the issuance of top-down market creation 
policies. 
 
5.3 The Market Motor 
The third motor of innovation observed was the Market Motor. Its dynamics, 
which emerged only recently, were characterised by a strong contribution to 
Entrepreneurial Activities, Knowledge Development, Knowledge Diffusion, 
Guidance of the Search, Resource Mobilisation and Market Formation. All 
system functions were fulfilled, except for the Support from Advocacy 
Coalitions. The main reason was that Market Formation was no longer an issue 
of politics; a market environment had been created as the result of formal 
regulations. Instead, Market Formation was taken up as part of regular business 
activities, i.e., marketing and promotion strategies that are directly linked to 
Entrepreneurial Activities. 
 
·  The most important structural driver of this motor was that an institutional 
basis was formed that induced market creation for ANG technology. This 
means that firms did not need to lobby for (additional) resources anymore. 35 
 
Instead they could take the opportunity to start investing in a refuelling 
infrastructure and to develop marketing strategies of their own. 
 
·  The Market Motor was not entirely developed yet, as both government 
institutions and markets were underdeveloped. This manifested itself in the 
limited role of private end-users and in the absence of refuelling 
infrastructure and long-term fiscal policies. Another barrier was (still) the 
resistance among a number of selectors. 
 
·  The most important impact of this motor was the increasing diffusion of 




Besides motors of innovation, vicious dynamics were also observed. This 
happened in the 1990s when a combination of internal and external conditions (a 
low priority of environmental issues, liberalisation policies in the energy sector, a 
disappointing techno-economical outcomes and a narrow actor base), led to a 
rapid breakdown of the ANGTIS. During this episode, developments were 
nevertheless supported by a small number of dedicated enactors which found 
refuge in niche markets. When external conditions shifted, the enactors managed 
to start a build-up again. Even when selector support was discontinued, enactors 
continued pro-actively to develop a TIS by consolidating the build-up already 
established, and waiting for better conditions to arise. 
 36 
 
5.5 Concluding remarks 
At the outset of this article it was suggested that the analysis of the ANGTIS 
could provide important insights regarding the take-off of a formative TIS. The 
analysis has pointed out that the take-off of the ANGTIS occurred only after a 
long period of developments characterised by different motors of innovation, and 
a period of severe decline. It was shown that each motor was driven (and 
hampered) by a particular configuration of structures. In turn, each motor 
contributed to the build-up and adjustment of these structures. 
 
All the motors were coupled to developments external to the ANGTIS as well. 
These involved policies (environmental regulations, liberalisation policies, EU 
subsidies), economic trends (oil prices) and technological developments (the 
biofuels debate). However, it was primarily the TIS structures, including 
dominant strategies taken by enactors and selectors, that determined the specific 
effect of these external factors on the dynamics within the ANGTIS. 
 
An important observation, in the light of a take-off, was that the more advanced 
motors arose from more developed TIS structures, for example, the Market 
Motor developed on the basis of a relatively mature technology which was 
embedded in supportive regulations and supported by a strong network of 
enactors and selectors. However, these advanced TIS structures were established 
by less advanced motors. The Market Motor could arise on the basis of the build-
up established by the System Building Motor - i.e., market creation policies and 
government structures - and likewise, the System Building Motor could arise due 37 
 
to the build-up established by the Entrepreneurial Motor - i.e. the formation of 
strong networks, intermediary structures and demand-side structures. 
 
With respect to the take-off, the System Building Motor was especially important. 
The driving force of this motor has been an inner core of dedicated enactors that 
were able and willing to organise themselves in networks, and to address not 
single projects but the TIS as a systemic whole, for instance, by lobbying for top-
down market creation policies. The enactors managed to reach their goal by 
luring in selectors. The more support from selectors, and the larger their variety, 
the better. However, selectors could only be reached if internal and external 
conditions were sufficiently attractive compared with other options available to 
them. In this case, the Entrepreneurial Motor had largely provided such 
conditions. After all, enactors could rely on mature ANG technologies and 
institutions and actor networks that were established as part of the 
Entrepreneurial Motor. 
 
A key barrier of the System Building Motor was the resistance from selectors 
residing in the incumbent energy system, including important national 
government structures. When this resistance was overcome, the ANGTIS 
developed further towards a take-off. Still, even after the rise of a Market Motor, 
the dynamics of the ANGTIS were hampered, most importantly by the absence 
of long-term government policies and, related to this, the absence of private end-
users. Despite all the advantages that a mature technology offers, a complete 
ANGTIS has not yet been created. The Market Motor is powerful and effective 38 
 
as a promise for the (near) future, but it remains to be seen whether the high 
expectations that it raises will actually be fulfilled. 
 
Policy makers, and other practitioners, may use the kind of insights developed 
here to develop strategies that target the dynamics of TIS build-up around 
particular sustainable energy technologies. This could be done by monitoring TIS 
dynamics, by supporting the conditions that drive motors of innovation and by 
overcoming the barriers that hamper them. 
 
A next step of research should be to find out more precisely what structural 
combinations lead to what motor of innovation and to find out whether motors of 
innovation tend to follow on each other, in general. 39 
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Table 1 Functions of technological innovation systems.  1 
System Function  Description  Event types associated 
 
 
F1. Entrepreneurial Activities   At the core of any innovation system are the entrepreneurs. These 
risk takers exploit business opportunities and perform innovative 
commercial and/or practice oriented experiments. 
 
Projects with a commercial aim, 
demonstrations, portfolio expansions 
 
F2. Knowledge Development  Technological research and development (R&D) are a source of 
variation in the system and are therefore prerequisites for innovation 
processes to occur. Non-technological knowledge is also of key 
importance. 
 
Studies, laboratory trials, pilots   
F3. Knowledge Diffusion  The typical organisational structure of an emergent innovation 
system is the knowledge network, primarily facilitating information 
exchange. 
 
Conferences, workshops, alliances   
F4. Guidance of the Search  This system function represents the selection processes necessary to 
facilitate a convergence in development. 
 
Expectations, promises, policy targets, 
standards, research outcomes 
 
F5. Market Formation  New technologies often cannot outperform established ones. In 
order to stimulate innovation it is necessary to facilitate the creation 
of (niche) markets, where new technologies have a possibility to 
grow. 
 
Market regulations, tax exemptions   
F6. Resource Mobilisation  Financial, material and human factors are necessary inputs for all 
innovation system developments. 
 
Subsidies, investments   
F7. Support from Advocacy 
Coalitions 
The emergence of a new technology often leads to resistance from 
established actors. In order for an innovation system to develop, 
actors need to raise a political lobby that counteracts this inertia, and 
supports the new technology. 
Lobbies, advice   
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Table 2: ANGTIS drivers, barriers and impacts underlying an Entrepreneurial Motor in 1970-1989.  1 
  Actors  Institutions  Technologies 
Drivers  ·  The main enactors are gas companies 
attempting to draw in ANG technology 
selectors. 
·  Important selectors backing up ANG 
technology are governments and bus 
companies. 
·  The enactors manage to draw in selectors 
by giving practical demonstrations of the 
possibility of ANG technology and 
promising a solution to pressing policy 
issues. 
  
·  High oil prices (external). 
·  Environmental issues (external). 
·  Promise of cheap and clean technology, 
partly based on US experience (external). 
·  Specific subsidy programmes. 
·  Low variable costs of natural gas. 
·  Availability of natural gas and ANG 
technology. 
·  Low emission characteristics. 
 
Barriers  ·  The group of enactors and selectors 
supporting ANG technology is small and 
closely linked to public services, i.e., 
utilities. 
  ·  Reliability problems. 
·  High investment and maintenance costs. 
·  Limited range of NGVs. 
 
Impacts  ·  A network is established consisting of a 
small number of enactors and selectors. 
·  The setting up of governmental support 
programmes. 
·  The first applications of ANG technology 
provide insights in (unexpected) 
technological bottlenecks. 48 
 
Table 3: ANGTIS drivers, barriers and impacts underlying an Entrepreneurial Motor in 1990-1999.  1 
  Actors  Institutions  Technologies 
Drivers  ·  Only a few dedicated enactors remain 
active, mostly gas companies and 
municipalities. 
·  The selectors are governments, especially 
municipalities. 
·  The enactors manage to join forces with 
the selectors by promising a solution to 
pressing policy issues. Their strategy is to 
develop a policy environment, e.g., 
licensing procedures, safety standards. 
·  Selectors remain active in niche markets. 
 
·  Environmental issues (external). 
·  EU Thermie programme (external). 
·  Market niches provide stability. 
 
·  Low variable costs of natural gas. 
·  Availability of natural gas and ANG 
technology. 
·  Low emission characteristics. 
 
Barriers  ·  Many of the enactors (gas companies) 
turn into selectors after a series of 
mergers. 
·  Massive exit of enactors and selectors. 
 
 
·  Lowering oil prices (external). 
·  Liberalisation in the energy sector 
(external). 
·  Risk-averse attitude of selectors. 
·  The belief in the feasibility of ANG 
technology has diminished and even turns 
negative. 
 
·  Reliability problems. 
·  High investment and maintenance costs. 
·  Limited range of NGVs. 
Impacts  ·  Most enactors and selectors have 
abandoned the ANGTIS. 
·  Networks are established by a handful of 
remaining actors, including municipalities 
and gas companies. 
·  A policy environment is established 
(licences, standards). 
·  ANG technology diffusion is reversed. 49 
 
Table 4: ANG refuelling sites available in the Netherlands by 2004.   1 
Location   Owner  Users 
Haarlem   Nuon   Nuon, Municipality of Haarlem 
Velsen  Nuon  Local refuse collection services 
Schiphol   Schiphol Airport  Schiphol Airport / public 
Amstelveen   Eneco Energy Amstelland   Eneco Energy Amstelland, Municipality of Amstelveen 
Almelo  Gas Company Cogas  Gas Company Cogas / public 
Amsterdam  Canal Bus  Canal boat operators 
Source: NGV (2007, 2008), SN (2008a). 2 50 
 
Table 5: ANGTIS drivers, barriers and impacts underlying a System Building Motor in 2000-2004.  1 
  Actors  Institutions  Technologies 
Drivers  ·  The enactor group has grown and consists 
of gas companies and a number of 
municipalities looking for a solution for 
local environmental issues. 
·  A number of municipalities have turned 
from selectors into enactors. 
·  The enactors form a network and develop 
strategies to draw in enactors and 
selectors from outside the TIS.  
·  The strategy of the network is to connect 
with municipalities, car dealers, 
governments and other selectors. They 
persuade these selectors on the basis of 
successful demonstrations of ANG 
technology in practice. They also promise 
a technological solution to important 
policy issues. Moreover they make 
attempts to create markets for NGVs. 
 
·  Air quality regulation (external). 
·  Adapted policy environment (licences, 
standards). 




·  Low variable costs of natural gas. 
·  Availability of natural gas and ANG 
technology. 
·  Low emission characteristics. 
·  The ANG technology has matured, 
meaning that reliability is no longer a 
problem. 
 
Barriers  ·  Lack of launching customers.  ·  Limited budgets for infrastructure 
development. 
·  Lack of long-term (fiscal) policy support. 
 
 
·  High investment costs. 
·  Lack of refuelling infrastructure. 
 
Impacts  ·  Selectors are increasingly drawn in, 
governments (local and national) as well 
as firms. 
·  A strong belief in ANG technology 
among enactors and selectors. 
 
·  Adoption of NGVs and natural gas 
refuelling infrastructure increases.  
·  The ANG technology is ready for 
widespread application. 51 
 
Table 6: Number of NGVs in the Netherlands and Germany measured in March 2007 and May 2007 respectively.   1 
  Total NGVs  NGVs / 1000 inhabitants  NGV share 
of total vehicles 
Number of refuelling stations: 
Constructed               Under 
construction 
Netherlands  603  0.04  0.01 %  8 (1:75 cars)  22 
Germany  60,000  0.73  0.12 %  720 (1:83 cars)  13 
Source: GVR (2007).  2 52 
 
Table 7: ANGTIS drivers, barriers and impacts underlying an emerging Market Motor in 2005-2007.  1 
  Actors  Institutions  Technologies 
Drivers  ·  Enactors and selectors have established 
strong networks across the ANGTIS. 
·  A variety of new selectors is drawn into 
the ANGTIS, including provinces, 
municipalities and system integrators. 
·  The strategy of enactors and selectors is 
to exploit the benefits offered by the 
promise of a mass market and develop 




·  Air quality regulation (external). 
·  Building prohibition (external). 
·  High oil prices issue (external). 
·  Climate change issue (external). 
·  Fiscal regulations benefit ANG use. 
·  Local market creation  policies benefit 
ANG use. 
 
·  Profits from bad reputation biofuels 
(external). 
·  Low variable costs of natural gas. 
·  Availability of natural gas and ANG 
technology. 
·  Low emission characteristics. 
·  The ANG technology has matured, 
meaning that reliability is no longer a 
problem. 
  
Barriers  ·  Private users are barely involved as 
selectors. 
·  Resistance rises among selectors and 
enactors not willing to support ANG 
technology but ‘forced’ to do so. 
 
·  Lack of long-term (fiscal) policy support. 
·  Concession policies cause resistance. 
 
 
·  High investment costs. 
·  Lack of refuelling infrastructure. 
 
Impacts  ·  Selectors are now constituting a 
significant demand for ANG technology. 
These include infrastructure contractors 
and numerous fleet owners. 
·  The promise of a mass market for NGVs 
and ANG technology. 
·  Diffusion of ANG technology increases. 
Applications include buses and other 
highly visible environments. 
·  Refuelling infrastructure is being 
deployed.     1 
  2 
Figure 1: Natural gas price development, indexed at 2000, estimated for small users, including taxes. Source: EnergieNed(2006).  3   54 
Notes  1 
                                                            
1 This contrasts with many other technologies for which TIS development has been studied so far. 
2 Natural Gas as used for automotive purposes is identical to the natural gas (also methane or CH4) 
used for the production of heat and power. 
3 See also ECN (1997a) Since the 1970s, the price of natural gas has been coupled to the oil price 
(ECN, 1997b; GT, 2006). Prices rose in the 1970s and in the early 1980s as a consequence of the oil 
crises (ECN, 1997b). From the late 1980s to the late 1990s prices remained stable, only to increase 
again when oil became scarcer again from 2000 on (primarily due to a rapidly increasing demand). 
4 Typically from 0.2-8 bar to 200 bar. Another possibility is to produce Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). 
This can be produced by cooling and/or pressurising NG. It has a higher energy density than 
compressed natural gas and is therefore economically attractive when the fuel has to be distributed 
over large distances. 
5 An alternative to the construction of public refuelling stations is the construction of private ones. The 
idea is that private drivers connect their car to the mains gas supply at home, which is widely used in 
the Netherlands for heating and cooking. The drawback of these slow-fill systems is that it takes a 
long time to fill the tank, meaning that refuelling has to take place overnight. 
6 Alternative emerging TISs may also be a disruptive factor in the development of ANG. For example, 
if liquid biofuels should provide a successful alternative to petrol and diesel, the need for natural gas 
could rapidly vanish. 
7 GVB Groningen, RET Rotterdam, HTM The Hague and (later) GVB Amsterdam. 
8 They embrace regular fossil fuels or, when it comes to innovation, LPG or a combination of diesel 
and particulate filters. 
9 Take, for instance, ENW, an energy company which, as a result of mergers, possesses a large part of 
the existing ANG refuelling infrastructure. When ENW merges into energy company Nuon, it 
abandons the project and tries to sell the refuelling stations in Velsen, Haarlem, Alkmaar and 
Amsterdam (Verbeek, 2002). 
10 Another example is Cogas planning the first public ANG refuelling station at a Shell outlet in 
Almelo, to be finished in 2001 (Cogas, 2007). 
11 Cogas’ ANG pump, for example, becomes a reference installation to the field, but only after Cogas 
convinces the relevant normalisation institute that it is safe (Cogas, 2007).   55 
                                                                                                                                                                      
12 The developments are stimulated by gas companies around Amsterdam and Rotterdam which 
provide the ANG refuelling stations. As in the abovementioned projects these firms run into 
difficulties when gas companies become subject to reorganisations, but most niches are eventually 
retained (Verbeek, 2002). 
13 This is underlined by the EU through its announcement of a goal of 20% utilisation of alternative 
automotive fuels, including NG, by 2020. 
14 The poor condition of the ANGTIS becomes clear when compared with developments in other 
European countries where ANG technology is emerging. In Germany, for instance, top-down policy 
directives have been imposed to develop a refuelling infrastructure (Verbeek, 2002; WNGB, 2007) 
and a low excise rate has been fixed to last until 2020. 
15 The first demonstration project, called GAIA (Gas Als Ideale Aandrijving) is initiated by the 
municipalities of Haarlem, Amstelveen and the Province of North Holland. The parties involved are 
refuse-collection companies, recycling businesses and the operator of Schiphol airport; the latter 
provides a site for a second refuelling station to be constructed by RWE (DT, 2003; Verbeek, 2002). 
A second project, called PRO-Aardgas, is specifically aimed towards private drivers. To accomplish 
this, a network is established with car dealers in the area (Fiat, Opel, Volvo). A scheme is installed in 
which a 25% discount is offered on the extra costs of purchasing a new NGV. Up to 350 consumers 
may benefit from the subsidy scheme. Support is also provided for the installation of refuelling 
stations at public sites (SN, 2008a). 
16 The Cogas project is situated in the rural region of Twente (province of Overijssel). Cogas has 
converted its own car fleet and installed a public refuelling station in Almelo (DTC, 2004b). The gas 
company releases a plan to diffuse NGVs and ANG refuelling stations throughout Twente. The aim of 
‘Mobiliteitsplan Twente Schoon’ is the conversion of 100 vans and 210 personal cars within two years 
(SN, 2008a). To support this, Cogas plans the set up of a second ANG refuelling station. This 
refuelling station will be installed in Hengelo by the end of 2004 with the support from DutCH4 
(2004a). It provides users with a 50% discount on ANG. The project is backed by car dealers and by 
the Almelo municipality (SN, 2008a). 
17 They are financed through the national government’s DEMO programme, a subsidy scheme 
executed by SenterNovem The project budgets are in the order of 4 M € (NGV, 2008; SN, 2008a).   56 
                                                                                                                                                                      
18 A case in point is NGV-Holland coming up with a strategy of lobbying the government and 
breeding commitment with new parties (NGV, 2008; Verbeek, 2002). 
19 It does this by buying up existing refuelling stations and by constructing new ones in the Haarlem-
Schiphol area and in Twente (FEM, 2004). 
20 Ministry of Spatial Planning and the Environment (Dutch: Volkshuisvesting, Ruimtelijke Ordening 
en Milieu: VROM). 
21 For instance, projects are started in Nijmegen, Tilburg and Breda (in the province of North Brabant) 
(DG, 2004a, b; FD, 2005a) and in Groningen, Leeuwarden and Drenthe (the northern provinces) a 
number of municipalities organise themselves into a public-private partnership called Energy Valley 
(DvhN, 2005; LC, 2005). 
22 Cogas remains active as a lobby organisation but decreasingly so (Cogas, 2007). 
23 Such as the UKR, EOS and the Energy Transition Programme. For instance, DutCH4 manages to 
gain financial support through the UKR scheme for the construction of the first ten pumps in the 
northern provinces. 
24 Some even study the possibility of utilising biogas, a climate-neutral renewable (TW, 2005a). 
25 Examples of provinces getting involved are Gelderland, Utrecht, Friesland and North-Holland 
(NGV, 2007; TW, 2005b). 
26 It should be noted that this effect is largely the outcome of international learning activities, although 
with a strong contribution from Dutch companies, and therefore not entirely the result of the ANGTIS. 
27 Another external factor is that the security of gas supply becomes a political issue, the most 
significant event being that Gazprom briefly cuts off gas supply to Ukraine, and thereby to the rest of 
Europe. However, the ANGTIS actually does not seem to be affected by this threat; instead it seems 
that so-called clean fossil energy sources gain ground. 
28 The oil companies consider ANG a competitor to existing technological options such as diesel. 
They attempt to obstruct the covenant but in the end they effectively fail to do so. Resistance also 
grows among municipalities and public transport companies, mostly where they are obliged to adopt 
ANG technology because of concession policies (Dutch4, 2007; NGV, 2007). 
29 As articulated in its White Paper on traffic emissions.   57 
                                                                                                                                                                      
30 The White Paper states that ANG may be an interesting alternative car fuel for the short term, but 
that, as petrol and particularly diesel combustion techniques are continuously improved, the 
environmental performance of ANG will be offset within years. 
31 Within the Energy Transition Programme, such platforms were installed as a means to circumvent 
the rather inert organisational structures of the ministries. 
32 A majority of political parties is supportive of specific policy measures as well (HP, 2005; NGV, 
2005). 
33 For the next year 12 M € is to be provided for the greening of buses and service vehicles of local 
governments. Also, MinVROM promises to approach the Ministry of Finance to design a fiscal 
framework supportive of ANG. The 12 M € subsidy is considered meagre by the ANG community 
(DT, 2005; NGV, 2007). In comparison, MinVROM is allocating 400 M € to a stimulation package 
for particle filters (Dutch4, 2007; MoH, 2008), which is regarded as an unsustainable end-of-pipe 
solution. 
34 The national government provides other stimuli as well: licensing procedures for the construction of 
ANG refuelling stations are simplified and MinVROM purchases eight NGVs for its own fleet 
(DutCH4, 2006a). 
35 The excise level is set at 3 €cents/m
3
. 
36 In Leeuwarden, Groningen, The Hague, Nijmegen, Hengelo and Tilburg. 
37 The provincial governments of Gelderland, Zeeland and Utrecht decide to stimulate NG. 
38 This is the case in North Holland (Haarlem/IJmond), Groningen and Gelderland. 
39 Formerly, such activities were undertaken by DutCH4 alone but, due to limitations of capital, only 
on a limited scale. Now DutCH4 provides the knowledge and Ballast-Nedam the additional money 
needed.  
The project amounts to an investment of about 10 M € in the next year and up to four times as much 
thereafter. 
40 Examples are PON (importer of NGVs) and Teesing (infrastructure development). 
 